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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3422 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TYRONE PRATT, 
   Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-07-cr-00778-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable John R. Padova 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 19, 2013 
 
Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 08, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Tyrone Pratt appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for a reduction of sentence pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  We will affirm. 
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 In January 2009, Pratt pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine base (“crack”), 
possession of more than five grams of crack with the intent to distribute, possession of 
marijuana with the intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 
drug trafficking crime.  The District Court found that Pratt was subject to a mandatory 
minimum sixty-month sentence on the crack counts, plus a mandatory consecutive sixty-
month sentence for the firearm count.  At the April 2009 sentencing hearing, the District 
Court imposed the aggregated mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months.  No appeal 
was taken. 
 In 2011, Pratt filed a pro se motion to reopen the case.  Appointed counsel argued 
that the revised penalties of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”) should apply 
retroactively to Pratt, and that Pratt no longer should be subject to the sixty-month 
mandatory minimum sentence for the crack offenses.  Counsel explained that the 11.6 
grams of crack
1
 at issue effectively placed Pratt in a “doughnut hole” of cases where the 
defendants were sentenced pursuant to the old statute’s five-gram trigger of the 
mandatory minimum sentence though the quantity of crack falls below the FSA’s twenty-
eight gram threshold.  Following a hearing, the District Court denied Pratt’s request to 
modify his sentence. 
 In August 2012, Pratt filed a pro se motion for  a reduction of sentence pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and the FSA.  He argued that the Supreme Court’s recent decision 
                                              
1
 The Appellee states in its brief that the quantity of crack was 12.5 grams.  The 
discrepancy in the amount does not alter the outcome of this appeal. 
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in Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012), supports his position that the 
amended mandatory minimum sentence provisions of the FSA retroactively apply to his 
case.  On August 13, 2012, the District Court denied Pratt’s motion, noting that Dorsey 
did not alter the conclusion that the FSA does not apply retroactively to defendants, like 
Pratt, who were sentenced before the effective date of the FSA.  Pratt timely filed this 
appeal. 
 We review the District Court’s ultimate decision to deny Pratt’s section 3582(c)(2) 
motion for abuse of discretion, but we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
legal interpretation of relevant statutes and guidelines.  United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 
152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 The FSA amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) by, among other things, increasing the 
amount of crack cocaine that triggered mandatory minimum prison sentences.  See 
Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2328-29.  In response to the FSA, the Sentencing Commission 
promulgated a temporary amendment that revised the offense levels in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 
relating to crack, and the revisions later became permanent by way of Amendment 750.  
Id. at 2329.  Although the Sentencing Commission decided that Amendment 750 should 
be applied retroactively, see United States v. Curet, 670 F.3d 296, 309 (1st Cir. 2012), the 
FSA itself is not retroactively applicable to defendants who were sentenced before its 
effective date.  See United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Although Pratt argues to the contrary, the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey does not 
affect this conclusion.  See Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2335 (noting that the ordinary practice 
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in federal sentencing “is to apply new penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, while 
withholding that change from defendants already sentenced”).  Rather, Dorsey held that 
the FSA applies to defendants whose offenses were committed pre-FSA but were 
sentenced after its effective date.  Id. at 2326.   Such is not the case here, and thus, Pratt’s 
reliance on Dorsey is misplaced. 
 Moreover, Pratt cannot obtain relief under section 3582(c)(2).  Section 3582(c)(2) 
permits a sentence reduction where a defendant was “sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Pratt argues that Amendment 750 
benefits him because the 11.6 grams of crack would now yield a sentencing range of 
fifteen to twenty-one months, without triggering the application of a mandatory minimum 
sentence.  As we have discussed already, the statutory changes concerning the operation 
of mandatory minimum sentences are not retroactively applicable to Pratt.  Further, the 
Sentencing Commission recognized that: 
[A] reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not 
authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and is not consistent with 
this policy statement if  . . . an amendment . . . is applicable to the 
defendant but the amendment does not have the effect of lowering 
the defendant’s applicable guideline range because of the operation 
of another . . . statutory provision (e.g., a statutory mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment) . . . . 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 app. note 1.  Thus, although Amendment 750 lowered the base offense 
levels for crack cocaine quantities listed in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), it did not have the effect 
of lowering Pratt’s guideline range because of the operation of the statutory mandatory 
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minimum when he was sentenced.  See United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 311-12 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (passage of a retroactive guideline amendment is irrelevant where a statutory 
mandatory minimum sentence is applicable).  Stated another way, Amendment 750 
revised offense levels, but it did not change the statutory mandatory minimum, and so it 
cannot provide the basis for a section 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction for Pratt. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
